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than necessary to the adjudication of the specific case presented. In a
common law jurisdiction and in the absence of specific constitutional
or statutory provisions to the contrary the highest court of that jurisdic-
tion could abolish the rule of governmental tort immunity utilizing the
rationale that if the reason for this common law rule is gone (or if it
never rationally existed) the rule should also go. The court's power
may only be tempered by its balance of power with the other branches
of government, but if the court is to insure that any transition to gov-
ernmental tort liability will be steady and orderly it must move with
caution as did the court in the instant case.
E. Kears Pollock
REAL PROPERTY-LANDLORD-TENANT-RENT WITHHOLDING AcT-The
Pennsylvania Superior Court has held that the Rent Withholding Act
does not immunize from eviction tenants who have failed to pay rent
into an escrow fund in a timely manner.
The National Council of the Junior Order of United American
Mechanics of the United States of North America v. Roberson, 214
Pa. Super. 9, 248 A.2d 861 (1969).
Plaintiff landlord and defendant tenants entered into a month-to-
month written lease in October, 1967. Defendants paid the rent for
four months, but in February, 1968, were notified by the Allegheny
County Health Department1 and the Bureau of Building Inspectors
of the City of Pittsburgh that the property occupied by them was
eligible for rent withholding under the Pennsylvania Rent Withhold-
1. The communication, in part, read:
Under State law, a Rent Withholding Program has been designed to encourage
landlords to make needed repairs. If you choose to use this plan, you will continue
to pay your rent, only instead of paying it to your landlord you would pay it into
an Escrow Account at Mellon Bank. You will continue to pay rent to Mellon Bank
until you have been notified by the Allegheny County Health Department that the
needed repairs have been made, following a reinspection of the property in your
presence.
If, after six months, the needed repairs have not been made and properly certi-
fied, the money remaining in the Escrow Account would be paid back to you.
Should you decide to withhold your rent, please appear immediately at the
Allegheny County Health Department, Room 649, City-County Building, telephone
number 281-4900, extension 784. If you want to use this program, it is important
that you act quickly since the law protects you against eviction only while you are
paying your rent into the Escrow Account.
214 Pa. Super. 9, 11, 248 A.2d 861, 862-63. (The concurring opinions appear in 249 A.2d
828.)
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ing Act.2 Under the Act, inspectors from either agency may declare
property to be unfit for human habitation if it fails to meet certain
minimum standards.' Upon such determination, the tenant has the
option of vacating the premises or paying the rent into an escrow
fund.' The escrow payments are for a six-month period, after which
the money is disbursed either to the landlord, if the necessary repairs
have been made, or to the tenant, if the repairs have not been made.5
The landlord may use monies from the fund during this period to
make repairs.6 Although the basic landlord-tenant relationship is un-
affected, 7 the landlord may not evict the tenant for "any reason"
whatsoever during this six-month period. 8
Defendants invoked their rights under the Act and began paying
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1969), provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, or of any agreement, whether oral or
in writing, whenever the Department of Licenses and Inspections of any city of the
first class, or the Department of Public Safety of any city of the second class,
second class A, or third class as the case may be, or any Public Health Department
of any such city, or of the county in which such city is located, certifies a dwelling
as unfit for human habitation, the duty of any tenant of such dwelling to pay, and
the right of the landlord to collect rent shall be suspended without affecting any
other terms or conditions of the landlord-tenant relationship, until the dwelling is
certified as fit for human habitation or until the tenancy is tenninated for any
reason other than nonpayment of rent. During any period when the duty to pay
rent is suspended, and the tenant continues to occupy the dwelling, the rent with-
held shall be deposited by the tenant in an escrow account in a bank or trust
company approved by the city or county as the case may be and shall be paid to
the landlord when the dwelling is certified as fit for human habitation at any time
within six months from the date on which the dwelling was certified as unfit for
human habitation. If, at the end of six months after the certification of a dwelling
as unfit for human habitation, such dwelling has not been certified as fit for
human habitation, any money deposited in escrow on account of continued occu-
pancy shall be payable to the depositor, except that any funds deposited in escrow
may be used, for the purpose of making such dwelling fit for human habitation and
for the payment of utility services for which the landlord is obligated but which he
refuses or is unable to pay. No tenant shall -be evicted for any reason whatsoever
while rent is deposited in escrow.
3. See Comment, Rent Withholding in Pennsylvania, 30 UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 148, 157-
160 (1968).
4. Escrow accounts ase established in Mellon National Bank and Trust Company,
payable at any of the branch offices.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1969).
[T]he rent withheld . . . shall be paid to the landlord when the dwelling is certi-
fied as fit for human habitation at any time within six months from the date on
which the dwelling was certified as unfit for human habitation. If . . . such dwell-
ing has not been certified as fit for human habitation, any money deposited in
escrow . . . shall be payable to the depositor. ...
6. Id., "[F]unds deposited in escrow may be used, for the purpose of making such
dwelling fit for human habitation and for the payment of utility services for which the
landlord is obligated but which he refuses or is unable to pay."
7. Id., "[T]he right of the landlord to collect rent shall be suspended without af-
fecting any other terms or conditions of the landlord-tenant relationship .. "
8. Id., "No tenant shall be evicted for any reason whatsoever while rent is deposited
in escrow."
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rent into the escrow fund. Their payments were made in an irregular
fashion, paying the March rent on April 5, the April rent on May 15,
the May rent on July 3, and the June rent on July 10. Plaintiff
entered judgment in ejectment against the defendants in June, 1968,
and the lower court subsequently upheld the judgment for plaintiffs
in November, 1968.9
After disposing of procedural issues not here relevant, Judge Mont-
gomery of the Superior Court discussed appellants' contention that
"the appellee landlord had not made the repairs required . . . and...
[that] . . . they were still protected against eviction since their rent
was presently payable into the escrow account, and was paid." 10 After
establishing that the Act did not affect the basic landlord-tenant rela-
tionship, Judge Montgomery concluded: "We find nothing in the Act
which provides for a continuation of the privilege of the tenant to
pay his rent into the escrow account or to occupy the premises beyond
the six month period set forth in the Act."" He therefore concluded
that the tenant was no longer protected from eviction after the initial
six-month period and affirmed the lower court.
Judges Hoffman and Spalding concurred in the result, but did not
agree with Montgomery's rationale. They felt that appellants could be
9. When appellants were behind two months in rent, appellees caused a judgment in
ejectment to be entered by confession against appellants according to the terms of the
lease. A writ of possession was issued in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County. Before the appellees could execute it, however, appellants filed a petition to
open the judgment and stay the execution. A rule to show cause was issued, and on the
return day, after oral argument, Judge Price ruled that if defendants promptly brought
their payments in the escrow account up to date and made future payments on the first
of each month, the action in ejectment would fail. Shortly thereafter, Judge Price was
informed that defendants had not complied with the terms of his ruling, and he issued
a writ of ejectment to the Sheriff.
Apparently, however, plaintiffs chose not to activate the writ, and the rent was paid
up immediately. The rent was paid the next month, though not on the first of that
month. Defendants were again threatened with eviction. They obtained an amendment
of Judge Price's order from Judge Wessel to permit the rent to be paid between the
first and tenth of each month, instead of on the first as originally provided. Appellees
petitioned to Judge Wessel to strike off his order and reinstate the order of Judge
Price. Judge Wessel issued a rule to show cause, and on the return day Judge Smith
considered the petition and answer, and shortly thereafter he made Judge Price's ruling
absolute. He stated that Judge Price's order had been final, and it should have been
appealed from, since "a judge of the Court of Common Pleas does not possess the
power to review the determination of a judge of the same Court." Julach Steel Corp. v.
McArdle, 116 P.L.J. 52 (1968).
During the interim between the second return day and Judge Smith's pronouncement,
the Allegheny County Health Department ordered the money in the escrow fund to be
returned to appellants, since appellees had failed to make the necessary repairs to the
property within the six-month period. Appellants petitioned Judge Price for a rehearing,
but this was denied, and they appealed to the instant court.
10. 214 Pa. Super. at 15, 248 A.2d at 864.
11. Id. at 18, 248 A.2d at 866.
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evicted only because they were tardy in previous payments to the
appellee. The tenant is protected "only if he pays his rent into the
escrow account in the timely manner specified by the lease arrange-
ment."'12 The concurring judges did not agree that the escrow period
should be limited to one six-month term if the landlord has failed to
make repairs. They did not, however, elaborate as to just how far the
period should be extended.
The instant decision appears to be the first appellate construction
of the Rent Withholding Act. There has been no adjudication of
the Act by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 13 It seems inapposite
that an Act so controversial in nature has not received more attention
from the courts. Whatever the reasons, it is certain that the tenants
whom the Act was designed to help have not availed themselves of its
protection.
But wherein does the protection lie if, as the instant court has ruled,
the tenant is no longer covered after the initial six-month escrow
period? If the landlord does not rehabilitate the premises, the tenant
is entitled to a refund of his rent. If the landlord does bring the
tenement within the minimum standards, the tenant receives nothing
in return. In either case, the six-month period is at an end, and this
presents a retaliating landlord with the opportunity for revengeful
eviction.
It is not difficult to understand the reluctance of the Court to
liberally construe the Act. It is manifest that the Act effectuates a
deprivation of the landlord's rights in traditional areas, rights which
for some time now have-been decreasing. 14 The instant decision gives
an indication that the statute will be strictly construed, since under
the Act the landlord is deprived of rights to which he was otherwise
traditionally entitled.1 5
12. Id. at 20, 249 A.2d 828 at 828.
13. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur on February 19, 1969.
14. For an excellent discussion in the area of rent and repair, see Comment, Sub-
standard Housing: The New Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act As a Solution, 5
DUQUESNE L. REv. 413 (1967). Few other states have provisions in their housing laws
for rent withholding. But it is notable that under the New York act, which most closely
resembles the Pennsylvania act, there appears to be no limit to the time when rent may
be withheld:
For the purposes of this paragraph such violation of law [relating to dangerous or
hazardous conditions or conditions detrimental to life or health] shall be deemed
to have been removed and no longer outstanding upon the date when the condition
constituting a violation was actually corrected, such date to be determined by the
court upon satisfactory proof submitted by the plaintiff or landlord.
N.Y. SOC. WELFARE LAw § 143-b(5)(b) (McKinney 1966).
15. "Since statutes of this kind are penal, in that they deprive the landlord of rights
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However, there is much that would possibly be gained by extending
the escrow period beyond a single term. A tenant may be less reluctant
to pursue his rights under the Act. A landlord may then possess more
incentive to rehabilitate his property knowing that a tenant might
remain in the dwelling for an indefinite period at no cost.
The inevitable argument that a landlord is deprived of basic rights
has some merit. But there is no more a deprivation of his rights than
that endured by others in commercial fields, e.g., the restraint on the
manufacturer through strict liability where he is unconditionally
liable for any product which he sends into the commercial flow. The
deprived right of the manufacturer to market defective products
without liability is heavily outweighed by the right of the consumer to
be protected.
Many bases have been advanced in support of the tenant's right to
habitable living quarters. Recently the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Reitmeyer v. Sprecher,16 holding a landlord liable in tort for in-
juries sustained by a tenant from the defective condition of the leased
premises, rationalized:
We must recognize the fact that . . . critical changes have taken
place economically and socially. Aware of such changes, we must
realize further that most frequently today the average prospective
tenant vis-a-vis the prospective landlord occupies a disadvanta-
geous position. Stark necessity very often forces a tenant into oc-
cupancy of premises far from desirable and in a defective state
of repair. The acute housing shortage mandates that the average
prospective tenant accede to the demands of the prospective land-
lord as to conditions of rental, which, under ordinary conditions
with housing available, the average tenant would not and should
not accept.
No longer does the average prospective tenant occupy a free
bargaining status and no longer do the average landlord-to-be
and tenant-to-be negotiate a lease on an "arm's length" basis.
Premises which, under normal circumstances, would be com-
pletely unattractive for rental are now, by necessity, at a premium.
If our law is to keep in tune with our times we must recognize
the present day inferior position of the average tenant vis-a-vis
the landlord when it comes to negotiating a lease. 17
he would otherwise be entitled to have enforced, they are strictly construed and not
extended so as to grant to the tenant any right not expressly provided for." 214 Pa.
Super. at 18, 248 A.2d at 866.
16. 431 Pa. 284, 243 A.2d 395 (1968). For a discussion of Reitmeyer, see 7 DuQUESNE
L. REV. 163 (1968).
17. 431 Pa. at 289-90, 243 A.2d at 398.
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts succinctly summarizes the rea-
sons for adopting a rule for imposing liability as in Reitmeyer:
[An] increasing recognition of the fact that tenants who lease
defective premises are likely to be impecunious and unable to
make the necessary repairs which their own safety and that of
others may demand; that one who is in possession of the premises
only for a limited term does not have the same incentive to main-
tain them in good condition as the lessor to whom they will revert
at the end of the lease; and that the landlord who receives benefit
from the transaction in the form of rent may properly be re-
quired to assume in return at least certain limited obligations
with respect to the safety of others .... 1
Both above statements were made in reference to a landlord's
liability in tort; however, the same rationale can easily be propounded
in relation to the Pennsylvania Rent Withholding Act. For, in effect,
the requirement is that the landlord repair his dwellings so that there
is less chance that a tort may occur, whether by disease or personal
injury, because of the inhabitable conditions.
The rationale discussed above may be put forth not only as justifica-
tion for the Act itself, but also for the extension of the escrow period.
The Act as it now stands is incomplete in that it does not provide the
tenant with sufficient protection to allow him to pursue his rights
without fear of retaliation by the landlord. An amendment to the
act is now in the process of being formulated. 9 Such amendment
would provide that the six-month escrow period be extended to correct
the present deficiency.
Other problems must also be considered-problems not directly
raised by the instant case. Judge Hoffman in his concurring opinion
mentioned several such problems, 20 and various others have been
18, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, Comment a (1966).
19. Information obtained in a telephone interview with Mr. Shalom D. Comay, Magis-
trate, Housing Court of the City of Pittsburgh (March 11, 1969).
20. See n.1, at 20-21 of 214 Pa. Super. 9, and at 828-29 of 249 A.2d 828, where Judge
Hoffman stated:
This case leaves unresolved some of the very difficult questions raised by the
statute. For example, it is unclear from the face of the statute: (1) whether a land-
lord of a building certified as unfit for human habitation may refuse to renew the
lease arrangement of a tenant who has paid his rent in a timely fashion. (2) under
what conditions and authority may moneys deposited in an escrow account pursuant
to the statute be used to effect repairs of the dwelling premises. (3) may escrow pay-
ments be made indefinitely until the dwelling is sufficiently repaired with periodic
six months disbursements of the accumulated rents to the contributing tenants to
the escrow account.
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ably discussed in legal periodicals.21 Further legislation is needed to
perfect the Act, for as Judge Hoffman stated:
These questions as well as others bound to arise are best settled
by future legislative amendment, although in the absence of such
action, it will be the duty of the courts to frame a solution based
upon their interpretation of the statute as written.2 2 (Emphasis
added.)
The instant case is evidence that the Act may, in close situations,
be construed in favor of the landlord, thus rendering the purpose of
the Act almost meaningless. It is anticipated that the amendment now
being formulated will be adopted by the Legislature in the near future
in order to partially fulfill the inherent potential of the Act.
Stephen G. Walker
PATENTS-PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER-The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals has held that the mere fact that elements of a claimed
method for the reduction of data may be accomplished using the mind
or a general purpose digital computer properly programmed does not
invalidate the claim as a process within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 101.
The court has further raised substantial doubt as to the unpatentability
of "mental step" claims generally and has applied the distinction of
functions occurring in nature being accomplished by methods outside
nature to mental functions.
In re Prater, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
Nov. 20, 1968.
Applicant-appellants, Prater and Wei, in 1961 applied for a patent
entitled "Reduction of Data From Spectral Analysis"' by disclosing
a method and apparatus to determine, with minimum error, the con-
21. See, Comments, Substandard Housing: The New Pennsylvania Rent Withholding
Act; (5) situations where the premises are so unfit that imminent danger exists.
vania, 30 UNIV. PITr. L. REV. 148 (1968). Among the problems posed therein are: (1)
lack of administrative machinery to effectuate repairs; (2) insufficient funds in the escrow
account to make repairs needed; (3) participation in rent withholding of one tenant in
a multi-tenant dwelling; (4) lack of education of the tenants of their remedies under the
Act; (5) situations where the premises are so unfit that imminent danger exists.
22. See n.1, at 21 of 214 Pa. Super. 9, and at 829 of 249 A.2d 828.
1. Serial No. 155,236, filed Nov. 20, 1961.
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